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KEYNOTE ADDRESS: ON WHAT BEING A (SMALL R)
REPUBLICAN MEANS*
Lawrence Lessig**
By definition, every year is a centennial. But I am particularly disap-
pointed by our failure to remark the profoundly important events that hap-
pened 100 years ago this year.  Of course, people noticed the centennial of
the Titanic.  We could have remarked the centennial of Wilbur Wright’s
passing.  We could note the centennial of Woody Guthrie’s birth.  But the
centennial I would like to remark is of the extraordinary presidential elec-
tion that happened 100 years ago this year.  America had a choice among
four very different candidates for president: Eugene Debs, a Socialist; Wil-
liam Howard Taft, the stand-pat Republican; Teddy Roosevelt, who had
started a new party to challenge the man he had selected for president—
William Howard Taft; and Woodrow Wilson.
Teddy Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson were very different people.
They had very different views about what the government should do and
how the government should deal with the problems of the day.  But both of
them called themselves “progressives.”  This is a fact about progressivism
that we forget today.  Today we think progressives are liberals.  But 100
years ago progressives came from every political stripe.  Progressives were
people who saw a system of corrupted government and imagined a system
that could do something more.  An astonishing fact about the election of
1912 is that between these two progressives, 70% of America voted in favor
of this progressive idea.  More voted for Wilson than for Roosevelt, but
70% identified progressivism as an ideal that they would back.
This progressivism was not just at the level of the United States.  It is
100 years ago this year too that Montana finally overcame an extraordinary
system of corruption that had weakened its government.  One hundred years
ago, Montana passed into law a series of reforms including a limitation on
the ability of corporations to participate directly in political elections.  One
hundred years ago, that referendum passed, and there began in Montana,
* Editors’ Note: This Article is an edited, annotated transcript of the Keynote Address to the
Montana Law Review’s Honorable James R. Browning Symposium on Election Law, The State of the
Republican Form of Government in the States: Debating Democracy’s Future, held at The University of
Montana School of Law on September 27–28, 2012.
** Lawrence Lessig is the Roy L. Furman Professor of Law and Leadership at Harvard Law
School, director of the Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics at Harvard University, and founder of Root-
strikers, a network of activists leading the fight against government corruption. He has authored numer-
ous books, including Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Our Congress—and a Plan to Stop It; Code
and Other Laws of Cyberspace; Free Culture; and Remix.
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100 years, almost, of elections that would not be dominated by corpora-
tions.
One hundred years ago, we could say that there was a certain victory
for democracy.  A victory that meant we could invest in that democracy.  A
victory against a certain kind of corruption.  But, of course, the corruption
of 100 years ago is very different from the corruption we think about today.
The corruption of W. A. Clark, the Senator who bought his way into the
Senate twice, is very different from the corruptions we face today.  And the
victory 100 years ago over that corruption, a victory over this image of
corporate control over politics, is a victory that took that corrupting influ-
ence and put it in its place.
I sometimes think that history is too much like the very worst of
Hollywood—repeating the same ideas over again and again.  Because as we
look back over these 100 years and recognize where we are today, we
should recognize that we have just come back to the same place that we
were 100 years ago.  And the question I want to ask tonight is: “What
should we have learned from 1912, and what have we forgotten?”
To answer that question, I want to first take us to a different place, a
place called “Lesterland.”  Lesterland looks a lot like the United States.
Like the United States, it has about 311 million people.  And like the United
States, there are about 144,000 Lesters in Lesterland.  So, about 0.05% of
the population of Lesterland is comprised of Lesters.
But Lesters in Lesterland have a certain kind of power.  Lesterland has
two elections.  It has a general election, in which every citizen gets to vote.
And it has a Lester election, in which only Lesters get to vote.  But here is
the rub—to be able to run in the general election you must do extremely
well in the Lester election.  You do not necessarily have to win, but you
must do extremely well.
That is the picture of democracy in Lesterland. What can we say about
this democracy?
I think we can say that, first, as the Supreme Court said in Citizens
United,1 it is certainly the case that in Lesterland the people have the ulti-
mate influence over the elected officials.  They have the ultimate influence
because the people get to vote in the general election.  But of course, the
people have “the ultimate influence” only after “the Lesters” have had their
influence first.  And that first influence certainly has an effect.  It certainly
changes the influences that determine who will govern Lesterland.
Second, and obviously, this dependence upon the Lesters will produce
a subtle, understated, and camouflaged bending to keep the Lesters happy.
It cannot be too obvious, because then you are just a sellout, but it cannot be
1. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Commn., 558 U.S. 310, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
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too hidden either, because then the Lesters will neither support you nor give
you the opportunity to run in the general election.
Third, any reform that would anger these Lesters is unlikely—highly
unlikely.
That is Lesterland.  There are three things I want you to recognize
about Lesterland.
First, the United States is Lesterland.  The United States also has two
elections.  It has a general election, and it has a money election.  In the
money election, it is the funders of campaigns who decide who wins, and in
the general election, it is the citizens who decide who wins.  But as in Les-
terland, here is the rub—to be able to run in the general election you must
do extremely well in the money election.  You need not necessarily win, but
you must do extremely well.  This is the picture of democracy in America.
We have a democracy in which the representatives are dependent upon the
funders.
But the relevant “funders” in the United States are just as few as the
“Lesters” in Lesterland—essentially, 0.05%.  In the United States in 2010,
0.26% of Americans gave more than $200 in a congressional election;
0.05% gave the maximum amount to any congressional candidate; 0.01%—
the 1% of the 1%—gave $10,000 or more in the election cycle.  And in this
presidential cycle so far, 0.000015% of America—47 Americans—have
given 42% of the Super PAC money that has been spent by candidates.  As
Politico puts it, “in an election purportedly being driven by the economic
concerns of the middle class, this top 0.07% of donors are more valuable
than the bottom 86%.”
Okay, so I am a lawyer, and when I look at this range—0.26%, 0.05%,
0.01%—0.05% is a fair estimate of the relevant “funders” in this system.
They are “the funders” who are “the Lesters.”
As we could say about Lesterland, so can we say three things about
USAland.  First, as the Supreme Court said in Citizens United, of course
“the people have the ultimate influence over elected officials”2—but only
after “the funders” have had their way with the candidates.  Second, and
obviously, this dependence upon “the funders” will in subtle, understated,
and camouflaged ways produce a bending to keep “the funders” happy.
Candidates for Congress spend anywhere between 30–70% of their time
raising money to get back to Congress or to get their party back into power.
As they do this, they develop, as any of us would, a sixth sense—a constant
awareness about how what they do might affect their ability to raise money.
They become in the words of the X-Files, “shape-shifters,” as they con-
stantly adjust their views in light of what they know will help them to raise
2. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910.
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money—not on issues 1–10, but on issues 11–1,000.  Leslie Byrne, a Dem-
ocrat from Virginia, describes that when she went to Congress she was told
by a colleague to “always lean to the green.”  And then to clarify, she went
on, “he was not an environmentalist.”
And finally, third, reform that angers “the funders” in this version of
Lesterland is highly unlikely.
So this is my first major point: the United States is Lesterland.
The second point is this: the United States is worse than Lesterland.
For if you imagine that if the Lesters received a letter in the mail that said
“we have this new system of government and in this system you Lesters
have been picked; you are the chosen ones; you get to select which candi-
dates the rest of us get to pick from,” you can imagine that the Lesters—
who come from all segments of society, rich and poor, black and white—
could develop aristocratic attitudes.  They could well begin to think: “What
should we do to help the society as a whole?  It is our job as Lesters to vote
in a way that helps society as a whole, and everybody will ask us what we
have done to help society as a whole.”  At least it is possible that the Lesters
in Lesterland would act for the good of Lesterland.  But in our land, in this
land, in USAland, the Lesters act for the Lesters.  This constant shifting
coalition of people who constitute the 0.05% is a shifting coalition made up
primarily of people who are eager to influence policy to benefit them but
not the public interest.  They do not even pretend it is the public interest.  It
is the interest to benefit them in a system that increasingly turns to them,
asking: “What do you need?”  In this sense, the United States is worse than
Lesterland.
And finally, my third point: Whatever is true about Lesterland, in our
land—in our Lesterland—in our USAland, this pattern for democracy is
corrupt.  I do not mean brown paper bag corruption with cash secreted
among members of Congress.  I do not mean Rod Blagojevich corruption—
buying and selling public office for personal gain.  I do not even mean W.
A. Clark corruption.  I do not mean any illegal act.  The corruption I am
talking about is perfectly legal.  I mean corruption relative to a baseline—
the Framers’ baseline—for how this nation was to function.
The Framers gave us what they called a “republic.”  As they explained,
what they meant by a “republic” was a representative democracy.  And as
they explained in many contexts, and in particular in Federalist 52, by a
representative democracy they meant a government that would have a
branch that would be “dependent upon the people alone.”3
So this is the model of government: you have the people and you have
the government—an exclusive dependency.  And through this exclusive de-
3. James Madison, The Federalist No. 52 354 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., Wesleyan U. Press 1961).
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pendency, the public good would be found.  But here is the problem: Con-
gress has evolved a different dependence.  There is no longer just a depen-
dence upon the people; there is increasingly a dependence upon “the
funders.”  This is a dependence too, but it is a different and conflicting
dependence from a dependence upon the people so long as “the funders” are
not “the people.”  This is a corruption.  It is what we could call a “depen-
dence corruption” because we have allowed the wrong dependence to
evolve inside the system and because it is not an exclusive dependence
upon the people alone.
This corruption has an effect.  First, it leads most Americans to be-
lieve, rightly so, I think, that money buys results in Congress.  Seventy-five
percent of Americans believe this, according to a poll we conducted for the
book that I released last fall.  The number is a little bit higher among Demo-
crats than Republicans, but I guarantee you before the Republicans took
control of the House of Representatives in 2010, just as many Republicans
as Democrats believed it.   So whether it is two-thirds or three-fourths, this
is the one thing we Americans believe: money buys results in Congress.
Second, that belief erodes trust and confidence in this institution.  Last
year ABC News and the New York Times reported that 9% of Americans
had confidence in Congress.  We should put that in context.  It is certainly
the case that at the time of the revolution, there was a higher percentage of
Americans who had confidence in the British crown than who have confi-
dence in our Congress today.
Third, this erosion of confidence erodes participation in the system.
Rock the Vote, which organizes and turns out young voters and in 2008
turned out the largest number of young voters ever in the history of this
nation, found in 2010 that a significant number of their voters were just not
going to vote.  When asked why, the number one reason given by far—2 to
1 over the second highest reason—was “no matter who wins, corporate in-
terests will still have too much power and prevent real change.”  And it is
not just kids who think this.  The vast majority who could have voted in
2010 did not vote, at least in part, because of this belief.
This point has been well known for more than a century.  As the Mon-
tana Supreme Court commented in their opinion upholding the Montana
law passed 100 years ago this year, W. A. Clark himself testified that
“many people have become so indifferent to voting because of the large
sums of money that have been expended in these campaigns.”4  And it is
not just voting.  As the Montana Supreme Court also said, citing extraordi-
narily good work by Edwin Bender from the National Institute on Money in
4. W. Tradition Partn., Inc. v. Atty. Gen. of Mont., 271 P.3d 1, 9 (Mont. 2011), cert. granted,
judgment rev’d sub nom., Am. Tradition Partn., Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (citing K. Ross
Toole, Montana, An Uncommon Land 184–185 (U. of Okla. Press 1959).
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State Politics, if you look at states where corporations are restricted in their
ability to participate in the political process and compare them to states
where corporations are not restricted, the percentage of individuals who
contribute to campaigns falls from 48% to 23%.5  When the ordinary person
recognizes that big money calls the shots, the ordinary person decides he or
she is going to spend his or her money someplace else.
So, if you look at this problem in this way, what we can do?  There is a
systemic problem: “the funders” are not “the people.”  This begs for a sys-
temic solution: to make it so “the funders” are “the people”; to give Con-
gress one way to fund their campaigns without Faust, without selling their
soul, and thereby convincing and alienating America that they have sold
their soul.  And the one, and perhaps only, way to do this is to openly and
firmly embrace a system of what I want to call “citizen-funded campaigns.”
What would a system of citizen-funded campaigns mean?  The first
point to recognize is, the internet notwithstanding, for as long as we can
see, campaigns are going to cost money.  They will therefore need to be
funded.  So, the first question is: “Funded by whom?”  Will campaigns be
funded by citizens or by noncitizens?  Noncitizens, like the Chinese or the
French, or corporations—for whether or not corporations are persons, no
one has ever suggested that they are United States citizens.  When Ameri-
cans are presented with this choice, the vast majority say, of course, that it
should be citizens who fund campaigns.
But that leads to a second question: “Which citizens?”  Should some
citizens or all citizens fund campaigns?
For the current system for funding campaigns is a citizen-funded sys-
tem, where only some citizens participate in funding our campaigns.  These
are the large-dollar campaigns funded by a small percentage of Ameri-
cans—the 0.26%, the 0.05%, and the 0.01%.  The Lesters.  These are cam-
paigns funded by the smallest slice of the 1%, evoking the same idea of
corruption that captured Montana 100 years ago.
So obviously, when I talk about citizen-funded campaigns, I do not
mean to refer to this model of funding campaigns.  But that leads some
people to the opposite extreme—what we typically refer to as “public fund-
ing of campaigns.”  This used to be the norm in presidential campaigns,
where the government decided how much money you needed to run your
campaign and, once you qualified, wrote you a very big check.  This sys-
tem, it turns out, is hated by most Americans.  Americans hate it for many
reasons.  One very salient reason is many people are concerned by any sys-
tem where basically “my money is being used to subsidize your political
speech.”  Also, of course, the system has become bloated and bureaucratic,
5. W. Tradition Partn., Inc., 271 P.3d at 234.
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evoking images that not many people would rally to in support of reform of
our system.  So again, when I talk about citizen-funded campaigns, I do not
mean what we typically refer to as the “public funding of campaigns.”
Instead, what I mean by “citizen-funded campaigns” is a system in
which everyone participates in funding campaigns but through a bottom-up
process.  This is a process where people and candidates opt-in to a system
where candidates take small contributions only.  The system then amplifies
the contributions to make it possible for a candidate to win a campaign by
taking small contributions only.
There are many versions of this system.  Arizona, Maine, and Con-
necticut have versions of it for their state offices.  Connecticut, when it
adopted this system, found 78% of the elected representatives opted in to
the system in the first year—Democrats and Republicans alike electing not
to take large contributions to fund their campaigns.
But these systems still suffer from the concern that “my money is sub-
sidizing your speech.”  So when I wrote my book, I wondered whether there
was a way to architect such a system so that it has the same feature of
bottom-up funding but without the flaw of “my money subsidizing your
speech.”
That objective led me to what I call the “Grant and Franklin Project.”
The system works like this: regardless of income level, all voters contribute
at least $50 of their income to the Federal Treasury.  Whether through in-
come taxes, payroll taxes, Social Security taxes, gas taxes, or cigarette
taxes, whatever, all of us send at least $50 of our money to the Federal
Treasury.  So under this system, the first $50 that all of us sent is rebated to
us in the form of a coupon, or “democracy voucher.”  Citizens are allowed
to give the voucher to a candidate if the candidate agrees to fund his or her
campaign with vouchers plus contributions limited to about $100 per citizen
only.  This is very similar to an idea that Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres
advanced more than a decade ago, but this makes the opportunity for a
candidate to take the money contingent upon his agreeing to fund his cam-
paign only with small dollar contributions.
Fifty dollars per voter adds up to $7 billion.  In 2010, the total amount
raised and spent in congressional campaigns was $1.8 billion.  So, $7 bil-
lion is about three times the amount raised and spent in 2010, meaning it is
real money, but representative.  The money comes from all of us, not the
tiniest fraction of those of us who are “the Lesters” in this system.  It is a
kind of one person, one voucher system that assures all of us are participat-
ing, or have the opportunity to participate, in the same way.
This is what I mean by citizen-funded campaigns.  And the point to
recognize is that if we had a Congress selected by such a system, selected
through small dollar contributions only, then we all could believe, as we all
7
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want to believe, that whenever Congress did something crazy, it might have
been because there are too many Democrats or because there are too many
Republicans, but not because of the money.  Because this system would
remove the premise that leads most of us to be as cynical about this institu-
tion as we are.
Now the problem with this story is that nobody talks like this.  I obvi-
ously do not literally mean nobody.  Somebody talks like this: I do.  But I
often feel like it is only me talking about the system like this.  I begin to
feel like my kids’ book, “Mr. Nobody.”  I am Mr. Nobody talking about
this while everybody else, Mr. Everybody, is obsessed with the focus on the
U.S. Supreme Court and the Citizens United decision.  Because, of course,
on January 21, 2010, a year and a day after President Barack Obama was
sworn into office, the Supreme Court started us on the proverbial “slippery
slope” down to the age of the Super PAC.  This age does not just include
the pretty, happy Super PACs of people like Colbert, but increasingly, it
includes Super PACs that evoke a much darker image.
That Supreme Court decision, of course, provoked extraordinary out-
rage.  Larry Tribe suggested it “marks a major upheaval in First Amend-
ment law.”  Jonathan Alter described it as the “most serious threat to Amer-
ican democracy in a generation.”
Suffice it that the case was not loved.  And indeed, the Washington
Post was able to show that opposition to the decision was high across the
board.  Democrats, Independents, and Republicans in significant extremes
opposed this decision and found it to be troubling for what it said about the
future of democracy.
That outrage began a series of remedies, and those remedies got us T-
shirts (“Corporations Are Not People”), it got us slogans (“Money Is Not
Speech”), and it got us organizations keen to see these slogans and these T-
shirts inserted into the Constitution.
My view is those remedies are wrong.  My view is the focus on Citi-
zens United is wrong.  My view is that this decision, in an extremely impor-
tant but narrow way, was right.  I do not mean “left versus right” right.  Of
course it was right in that sense.  But I mean right in the sense of correct.
The Supreme Court was correct about the very narrow question that was
presented:  whether this organization, Citizens United, a non-profit political
filmmaker, should be allowed to use its corporate funds to promote its
movie “Hillary: The Movie.”  And my view of the First Amendment is the
answer to that question has got to be “of course it should.”  Of course it
should be free to use its corporate funds to promote its movie.  Whether or
not corporations are people, this film is political speech, and in our tradi-
tion, political speech is restricted if and only if there is corruption.  Corrup-
tion means, as the Supreme Court says it means, quid pro quo corruption.
8
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So, when the Court said in Citizens United that “independent expenditures,
including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the
appearance of corruption,”6 the important word there to focus on is “inde-
pendent.”  What the Court was saying was that “independent” means there
could be no quid pro quo involved, and therefore, if you think corruption is
quid pro quo, “independent” expenditures, by definition, are not corruption.
That is one conception of corruption.  I have advanced another—de-
pendence corruption. But even under my conception of corruption, the non-
profit Citizens United promoting “Hillary: The Movie” does not signal im-
proper dependence.  So under either definition of corruption, this is not cor-
ruption.  Therefore, under either conception of corruption, this decision, in
my view, was right.  It was right about this entity, but it was wrong to
suggest (and it is my view this is not yet a holding, it is just a suggestion,
and this is not actually a quote from the opinion, but this is what people
read the opinion to say) that “therefore there is nothing Congress can do to
limit the role of independent expenditures.”  People think the Court said
that.  I agree the Court suggested this, but in my view, it did not say it.  This
broader view is just a suggestion.  It is not yet a holding.  And it is my view
it would not be a holding if the Court was presented with the right case.
So, what is the right case here?  Imagine a statute called the “American
Anti-Corruption Act.”  Let us call it the AA Act just to evoke the depen-
dency metaphor as strongly as we can.  Imagine the AA Act targets what
we will call Independent Political Action Committees—iPACs.  And imag-
ine iPACs are spending their money independently without coordinating
with a candidate.   Further imagine the statute has two parts: (1) No iPAC
may accept contributions greater than $5,000; and (2) every contribution
above $200 dollars to an iPAC must be disclosed.  The Court is pretty clear
that the second provision is constitutional.  What about the first?  Is that
constitutional?
Well, that depends upon whether this rule is tailored to “corruption.”
If you think corruption is just quid pro quo corruption, then, this statute is
not constitutional.  But if corruption also includes what I call dependence
corruption, then it is constitutional because it is attacking what has now
become recognized as a kind of dependence corruption.  It is plain to every-
body, and I am sure even the Supreme Court, that the system the Court gave
birth to in Citizens United has evolved a dependence on these large contrib-
utors, upon “the Lesters,” that is different and conflicting with a depen-
dence upon the people alone.  And if they take seriously the Framers’ con-
ception of the balance and limitations intended in our system, I think they
6. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909.
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should see this as corruption and they should justify a narrowly tailored law
targeting that corruption.
So in summary, in my view, number one, Citizens United talk is mis-
taken.  It is not clear there is no power in Congress to restrict the kind of
speech all of us think needs to be restricted, namely unlimited contributions
to committees that are spending in the name of the contributors.  And, num-
ber two, I do not think Citizens United would be reversed by the gimmicks
that have been advanced as a way to reverse Citizens United.  Declaring
corporations are not persons feels good.  I get it.  I can feel the romance in
declaring only “people are people.”  I get the joke.  I have repeated it: I will
believe a corporation is a person when Texas executes one.  All of that is
perfectly understandable from a political perspective, but from a legal per-
spective, it is not at all clear that declaring corporations are not persons
reverses the effect of Citizens United.  And finally, in my view, adopting
the slogan “money is not speech” would do far more harm than good.
These are gimmicks—effective politically, but they will not solve this prob-
lem if indeed a constitutional change is needed to solve this problem.
My second view is that Citizens United talk misses the point of what
the problem here is.  Here is the point.  On January 20, 2010, the day before
Citizens United was decided, we must remember, our republic was already
broken. Citizens United may have shot the body, but the body was already
cold.  Even if we reverse that decision, this is still Lesterland.  We still have
a system, even with no corporate participation at all, where the tiniest frac-
tion of the 1% is funding the elections, which produces exactly the kind of
corruption that I think Lesterland illustrates.  This will remain so long as
“the funders” are not “the people.”  Rather than obsessing about whether
corporations are people, we need to dedicate ourselves to the real work, the
extremely hard work, to get Americans to recognize we need a system
where “the funders” are “the people.”  Is it possible to win that fight?  Is it
possible to imagine Congress passing the laws to win that fight?
As Dean Irma Russell was suggesting in her introduction this evening,
there are moments, indeed every time I think about this in a rational way,
when I am convinced that it is absolutely impossible to imagine this Con-
gress making the changes that need to be made.  What evokes this most
strongly is an image given to me by Jim Cooper, a Democrat from Tennes-
see who has been in Congress for as long as all but about 20 other members
of Congress.  When I interviewed him for my book, Cooper said, “You see
the problem is that Capitol Hill has become a farm league for K Street.”  K
Street is where the lobbyists work.  Cooper said that “members and staffers
and bureaucrats have this increasing common business model in their head,
a business model focused on their life after government, their life as lobby-
ists.”  Public Citizen calculated that, between 1998 and 2004, 50% of the
10
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Senate and 42% of the House left to become lobbyists, and those numbers
have only gone up since 2004.  This year, United Republic calculated that
the average salary increase for those they could track who were going to
become lobbyists was 1,452%.  In a world where everyone depends upon
this system surviving for their future, how could we imagine them changing
this system?
The answer is that we have to find a way around the cancer that is now
the Beltway.  We have to find a way around it, and I am going to suggest
the beginnings of such a way.
The chattarati in our political system say the interesting division in
American politics is between the left side and the right side.  I think the
interesting division in American politics is between the inside and the
outside.  Inside—life within the Beltway—and outside—life in the rest of
America.  If you think about and listen to what the people on the inside talk
and obsess about and compare it to what people on the outside talk and
obsess about, to borrow and remix a title from John Gray’s book, I begin to
think that D.C. is from Mars, and we are from Earth.
This distinction between the inside and the outside suggests a certain
politics—what we could call, following Nigel Cameron, a kind of exopolit-
ics: the politics of the outsiders.  The politics of the outsiders is not a polit-
ics of politicians.  These are not wanna-be Representatives or wanna-be
Senators who are just finding their way into the system to climb up in the
system.  This is citizen politics.  These are citizens demanding that politics
change.  If we look at the last 14 years we can see a series, with increasing
frequency, of waves of self-described “open-source energy” that comes
from this exopolitical movement driving for significant change.
There are many examples of this, increasingly frequent.  The first was
MoveOn.org in 1998.  That organization was born when two Berkeley pro-
grammers looked at Washington, which at the time was obsessed with the
question of whether Congress should impeach a president for lying about
whether he had sex with a member of his staff, and said “this is crazy.”
They said “there are a lot of serious problems that our country faces.  This
is nowhere near the top.”  They started a group devoted to saying Congress
should censure the President and move on.  Within a few weeks they had
gathered millions of signatures on their petition demanding that Congress
end this obsession, Democrats and Republicans alike, and that was the first
example of the web empowering a movement that did not have its roots in a
lobbyist’s office inside the Beltway.
I think the Tea Party, too, was an exopolitical movement, at least when
it was born.  Today it has been co-opted by too many Beltway Republicans,
but when it was born, I think it represented exactly the same kind of exo-
political frustration and anger demanding that the system wake up and be
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responsive to at least Tea Partiers’ conception of the views that should
guide what politics did.
I think the Occupy movement, one year old last week, was a similar
exopolitical movement.  And I think the movement that stopped
Hollywood’s latest round of regulations to try to control “piracy”—the
SOPA battle—was an exopolitical movement: millions contacted their con-
gresspersons, because of the extraordinary online campaign that woke up to
demand they stop this bill, including Wikipedia shutting down for a day in
the name of stopping the bill, and Congress then balked.  And for the first
time, the copyright lobbying was stopped by a grassroots exopolitical
movement.
My view is if there is hope, the hope is here.  But the challenge here is
this: the kind of change we are talking about is fundamental.  It is not nec-
essarily a constitutional change, but it is fundamental.  Fundamental change
needs a cross-partisan movement to support it.  I do not mean a bipartisan
Kumbaya movement where we all say: “yeah, we all agree with each
other.”  I am not talking about Kumbaya here at all.  I am talking about a
movement that cuts across partisan lines.  The kind of movement the origi-
nal progressives represented.
But right now this exopolitical movement is extremely polarized.  Eve-
ryone in our society—the politicians, the political parties, the media, even
the dot orgs that are trying to make the world a better place—practices this
business model of polarization.  It is a business model that teaches that we
all profit the more we divide people and teach them to hate each other.  This
is a kind of a Ray-Ban culture—extremely polarized, but very cool.
The question then is whether there is a way to get beyond this polariz-
ing “us” versus “them.”  And if we can, it begins with a certain recognition
that we can trace back to Henry David Thoreau.  Writing at Walden Pond in
1846, Thoreau wrote, “There are a thousand hacking at the branches of evil
to one who is striking at the root.”  Let’s call that one a “root striker.”  What
the root striker sees is, if you step back from the issues that any of us care
about and connect the dots, whether it is health care reform on the left or
government bailouts for the right, whether it is global warming for the left
or a complex tax system for the right, whether it is financial reform for the
left or financial reform for the right, what the root striker recognizes is that
we get no change in any of these areas until we change this corruption.
This exopolitical movement must see this fact and must change in light
of it.  What it needs to do is to think about how to build an alliance that
focuses on common ground and is diverse yet cross-partisan.  The alliance
should include different people with different values who find a way to
stand together on a common ground.  I do not mean an alliance focused on
a common end.  I do not think we have a common end between the ex-
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tremes of this American political movement, but we have a common en-
emy.  The common enemy is this corruption.  It is this picture of democracy
that blocks the opportunity for people on the left and people on the right to
get from this government what they believe this government should pro-
vide.
So how could we get there?  Well, you have to think about first steps,
and these are just tiny first steps.  The first step is a pledge.  If the biggest
obstacle to reform is what Jim Cooper describes, the temptation to this ex-
traordinary pay increase once you cash out from government, then this in-
stitution is not likely to vote for any change that changes the system be-
cause that is a vote to cut off this extraordinary reward when they leave the
institution.  We have to begin to think about how to populate Congress with
members who do not have that conflict and who have no interest in continu-
ing to serve in Washington as a lobbyist after they have stopped serving in
Washington as a representative.  The group I work with, “RootStrikers,”
has launched something we call the “No Lobbying Pledge.”  It is an elabo-
rate document.  The core of it is basically this: members and candidates say
“I pledge that if I am elected to Congress, when I leave, for ten years, I will
not become a lobbyist.”  In detail, the pledge means, “I will not provide
lobbying services, and if I do, any money I get has to be given to a charity.”
We launched that about a week and a half ago.  The first person to sign the
pledge was Jim Cooper.  The first idea is that, when you hear a member
plea to you for your vote or a candidate plead and ask you to support him or
her against the incumbent, you ask: “Will you work exclusively for us or
will you also be working for your future employer, the lobbyists, and will
you pledge to us so that we can be confident you are just working for us?”
That is number one.
Number two: I want you to believe in a draft.  Now that is a little hard
to sell people on, but the thing to recognize is that none of us trust this
institution to fix the system.  A poll by the Clarus Group found that 80% of
Americans believe that the changes in reform that we have seen before have
been designed more to help current members of Congress get re-elected
than to improve the system.  So whatever they do, we read them as doing it
just to benefit themselves.  So, what we need to think about is how could
we begin to build a way to trust us, not them; a way to propose reform that
we—citizens—should push to get behind.
When I was asked to testify in July to the Senate Committee about the
response to Citizens United, I proposed one such idea.  I said to them,
“Look, the biggest problem you have is that nobody will trust any change
you make so you should turn to the people and ask them.  Convene what we
could call citizens’ conventions.”  You can think about a citizens’ conven-
tion as just a kind of jury; it is a jury in the sense that it is randomly se-
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lected, but we basically draft citizens into this civic service just like we
used to draft citizens into military service.  By randomly selecting mem-
bers, we guarantee the convention is representative as long as it is a large
enough jury.  Then these members are given the evidence.  They are given
an opportunity to understand the nature of the problem and then given a
chance to deliberate in the model of what people here will recognize as Jim
Fishkin’s deliberative polling.  Let us call that “A Citizen Convention.”
Imagine Congress convening four of them and having one former president
chair each of these four conventions.  And then let these conventions an-
swer two questions.  First, “Is there a problem with the system the way it is
or is everything just fine?”  And second, “If there is a problem, then what
are the changes that should fix it?”  And when these deliberative polls,
these conventions, come up with ideas, then let us make them, Congress,
listen to them and respond to them in a way that takes them seriously and
identifies them as a source of insight into what we the people believe,
which is not tied to the current system and is not tied to the partisans who
currently speak for the system.
Then there is number three.  We need a way to make this problem boil
over and that happens by it boiling up state by state and by engaging in
practices that demand reform.  Already we have seen this with the move-
ment to overturn Citizens United—getting state legislatures to call for an
amendment to overturn Citizens United.  The Framers themselves imagined
only one way that we could ever rally the people to take on a corrupt insti-
tution.  If Congress were the corrupt institution, under Article V of our Con-
stitution, states may begin to call for a convention for the purpose of pro-
posing amendments to the Constitution.  One hundred years ago this year,
we came closer than ever to having such a convention.  When Congress
refused to change the system from appointed senators, the system that W.
A. Clark used to become the Senator from Montana, the people increasingly
demanded the change.  When Congress would not change it, then state by
state, resolutions were passed calling for a convention.  When we were
within one vote of having enough states to call for a convention, some in
Congress got terrified.  What would a convention do?  They quickly sent
out the reform that capitalized on the movement that had been building for
many years to demand Senators would be elected.  Even if you do not get to
the convention, the point is this process begins to register the demand for
reform in a credible state-by-state way and force Congress to answer.
These three steps are three small steps, but what they are designed to
invoke is this cross-partisan citizen politics, this exopolitical movement.
My view, again, is that the only chance that we have to restore this republic
is a movement of this kind.
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Benjamin Franklin, when he was carried from the convention in Phila-
delphia, was stopped by a woman on the streets and asked, “Mr. Franklin
what have you wrought?”  Franklin responded, “A republic, madam, if you
can keep it.”  A republic: by which he meant a representative democracy; a
government with a branch “dependent upon the people alone.”
We have lost that republic.  All of us have to act to get it back.
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